AI English Translation, Pages 26-50
Directorate of Information and General Records
Directorate of Political Affairs
Subject /
⟦illegible⟧
Director General
19 / /
Director of Political Affairs
19 / /
⟦Copy to the Directorate⟧
⟦illegible⟧
Assistant Director
International Department ( )
19 / /
Directorate
Information and General Records
Directorate of Political Affairs
International Department ( ) Section ( )
Form (3)
Mr.: Director of ⟦Intelligence⟧ ⟦Division⟧
Subject /: ⟦Information⟧
Following is ⟦notice⟧ ⟦number⟧ 5295 on 10/12/1982 ⟦received⟧ from ⟦Intelligence⟧ in the name of:
1. Arafat's visit to Cairo was previously agreed upon, after
⟦President⟧ Sadat ⟦extended⟧ an invitation to Arafat conveyed by the former ⟦Vice⟧ President ⟦Hosni Mubarak⟧
⟦during⟧ telegrams. The splinter organizations and ⟦hostile⟧ radio stations issued
statements ⟦denouncing⟧ this visit, claiming that Arafat's visit
⟦is considered⟧ the first step towards a peaceful solution.
2. Arafat considered his visit to Cairo at this time a ⟦political⟧ and ⟦national⟧ necessity
since unity with Egypt would be followed by ⟦satisfaction⟧ from the Arab countries, and Arafat ⟦wanted⟧
Iraq to be the first supporter of his step and the one most backing him.
3. He indicated that it is likely that contact with Jordan will be made soon ⟦and perhaps⟧ a ⟦joint⟧
⟦project⟧ will be established under joint chairmanship to adopt the Reagan project, and not to link ⟦the matter⟧
to the basis of Camp David, and contact with the French ⟦to include⟧ conditions for ⟦recognition⟧.
Please be kind enough to review ⟦and take⟧ what is necessary ⟦and provide us⟧ ⟦with whatever⟧ ⟦is available⟧ ⟦to you⟧ ⟦of⟧ ⟦new⟧ ⟦information⟧
⟦about⟧ ⟦developments⟧ ⟦of the position⟧ ⟦on the visit⟧ ⟦and the means for that⟧
⟦for follow-up⟧ ⟦line⟧ ⟦at your disposal⟧ with appreciation
⟦Fadil⟧ ⟦Mahmoud⟧ ⟦Jaber⟧
18 / 10 / 1982
Directorate of Information and General Records
Directorate of Political Affairs
Subject /: Information
Director General:
19 / / :
⟦Please proceed⟧ briefly with a subsequent memorandum, the data available to you regarding the ⟦above⟧ subject
Director of Political Affairs:
19 / / :
Mr. Deputy Director General, Respectfully:
Kindly requesting you to review the information available to us regarding the movements tour of
the Palestinian situation, and we believe that positive steps may be drawn according to
the extension of a plan in place, and that the display of some resentment from some people resulted from a visit
of a program that was agreed upon to show dissatisfaction and reactions and others, as you noticed
what was stated in the bulletin of 7/24/78 that the Palestinian movement is continuous
and its repercussions on our paperwork officer, and this clarifies the international circle )
the value and results that are being studied and developed
Deputy Director
19 / /
A copy to Information
Above, and another
to the Director
2/24
130 - 244
Directorate
Information and General Records
Directorate of Political Affairs
International Department ( ) Section ( )
Form (3)
Mr.: ⟦Director of the Information Division⟧
Subject /: Information
Our letter No. 4846 dated 7 / 10 / 1984 which includes the following:
1. A number of members of the Executive Committee of the PLO and members of the National Council
began to retreat from their previous position regarding Arafat's movements to visit Egypt.
2. Arafat's meeting with Hosni Mubarak came as a step in movements for his visit to Jordan
in the future despite the media campaign launched by Syria and Libya.
3. Arafat cannot concede anything essential regarding the Palestinian cause,
but rather the gain as he sees it in his future positions.
4. Egypt ordered negotiations with Israel and the regime of Hafez al-Assad directly and indirectly
to solve the Palestinian cause.
5. Sadat's visit in the past to Egypt was agreed upon before he went, just as Egypt
is taking two directions, which are:
A. A direction led by Khalid, Hassan, and Hani al-Hassan, which is moving towards King Hussein's line
in Jordan. Arafat has arranged to score a point in this field.
B. The second direction says that the first direction is incorrect and says that the
Organization must open a new page by restoring the relationship with Egypt and providing
positive services and major guarantees, the most important of which is escaping Syrian hegemony
and its link with Jordan from a position of strength.
Comment:
The Organization currently seems to be heading towards strengthening the relationship with Egypt and giving it great importance in
resolving the developments of the Palestinian cause, as the Egyptian role has a significant impact on
the status of the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue despite the lack of Palestinian
conviction, which gives it weight on the global level and contrary to what the
success of the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue entailed in the previous period, which still
⟦Abu Mazhar sees⟧ in ⟦his opinion⟧ that one of the reasons for the Syrian-Palestinian crisis
Likewise, the Palestinian leadership suffers from a great maneuver through which it can ⟦...⟧
towards negotiations with the Americans from a position of strength.
Please be kind enough to review -- with appreciation
Nael Ahmed Khudair
12/7/1983
Council of the
Revolution Command
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
SECRET
Number: Sh1 / 5295
Date: 12 / 12 / 1984
S
25
12 / 12 / 1984
Directorate of Information and General Records
2922
12 / 12 / 84
To / Directorate of Information and General Records
Announcement
We have learned the following:
01 Arafat's visit to Cairo was previously agreed upon (that the meeting with Mubarak would take place in
Port Said, and in the event that an interview with him was not held, he would go to Tunisia to visit the prisoners
of Ansar camp, then head to Baghdad and Jordan when Abu Iyad has paved the way
for his visit to Cairo).
02 What happened was that Arafat was received with a grand reception in Port Said, in which senior
Egyptian officials participated, led by the Egyptian Prime Minister, and after that the meeting was held
with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
03 This meeting was without the approval or notification of the P.L.O. because Arafat knew in advance
that the organization would not agree to it, and for this reason Arafat closed the direct
telephone line with him and shut down the telegram receiving device.
04 Arafat's meeting with Hosni Mubarak created Palestinian reactions in addition to other
reactions as follows:
A. The dissident organizations issued statements of condemnation and challenge and considered this act
a complement to Camp David; Hawatmeh also issued a statement regarding this and requested by phone
the dismissal of Arafat.
B. The P.L.O. and the unions issued a statement of condemnation, and a number of P.L.O. leaders
also made statements and condemnations for the following reasons:
First - Considering the visit a Palestinian and Arab surprise.
Second - In line with the obligations approved by the National Council not to contact
Egypt except after a common Arab position is taken regarding that.
Third - Fear of the split and crack that might afflict the organization.
To be referred to the Palestine Division
on the occasion of Arafat's visit
⟦illegible⟧
12/12
⟦signature⟧
12/12
( 1 - 2 )
SECRET
130-244
Revolutionary Command Council
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Number: ⟦line⟧
Date: / / 198
Secret
Notice
05 Yasser Arafat will visit Tunisia after the negative reactions end; the meeting caused
a major rift between Egypt and Israel as it ignited the enthusiasm of the Egyptian people for the Palestinians
and their cause.
06 America supported the meeting and considered it a motivating step for Arab governments to adopt a policy that is more
flexible for solving the Palestinian issue.
07 Comrade Abdul Rahim Ahmed reported the following information: -
A. Abu Ammar had prepared himself for this visit and informed the members of the Central Committee that
during his passage through the Suez Canal, if an invitation was extended to him, he would accept it, and this
is exactly what happened.
B. Arafat forged this path as he expects that he will become closer to Iraq
and more hostile toward Syria.
C. Comrade Abdul Rahim Ahmed proposes the following: -
First. Contacting Jordan without setting preconditions for dialogue, especially the condition
of accepting the Reagan project.
Second. Contacting Egypt so as not to link the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue as a prelude
to involvement in the settlement process based on Camp David.
Third. Contacting the French in order to receive Arafat also without the condition
of mutual recognition.
Fourth. The necessity of starting a dialogue with some resistance factions for the purpose of cutting their relationship
with Syria, as a large portion of them is looking for an alternative to Syria.
Please be informed.. with appreciation.
For/ Director General of the Secret Service
- 2 -
Secret
Revolutionary Command Council
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Secret
No.: 544
Date: 19 / 2 / 198
Notice
To / Directorate of Information and General Records
Attached is a copy of the press report from the North Yemen embassy regarding Yasser Arafat's visit to Egypt and an article
by Sheikh Fahd Al-Ahmad, President of the Sports Youth Union.
Please kindly review ..... with appreciation.
⟦signature⟧
On behalf of / Director General of the Secret Service
2/16
(1-1)
Secret
7 M
⟦handwriting⟧
⟦illegible red marks⟧
Revolutionary Command Council
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Number ⟦B/8250⟧
Date 12 / 7 / 1982
Secret
⟦line⟧
⟦Information Directorate⟧
⟦4566⟧
⟦12/7/1982⟧
Information
To / General Information and Records Directorate
Below are the most important points of Yasser Arafat's visit to Algeria:
Mr. Yasser Arafat paid a two-day visit to Algeria and met during the visit with President
Chadli Bendjedid. His talks focused on the latest developments in the Palestinian cause and relations
between resistance factions within the PLO. Arafat's visit falls within the framework of consultation
ongoing between the PLO and Algeria and informing Algerian officials about the course of matters.
Note that Palestinian-Algerian relations have witnessed an escalating development, especially during
the events of Beirut and Tripoli. George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh visited Algeria following
Arafat's visit.
Please be informed... with appreciation.
For/ Director General of the Secret Service
12 / 7
( 1 - 1 )
Secret
⟦35⟧
Council of
the Revolutionary Command
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Number: 4846 / Sh1
Date: 7 / 2 / 1982
Secret
Notification
Directorate of Information and Records
Number 2524
Date 7 / 2 / 1982
To / General Directorate of Information and Records
Below are the most important pieces of information received from our station in Amman regarding Yasser Arafat's visit to
Cairo from two sources:-
1. The first source:
a. A number of members of the Fatah Executive Committee and members of the Palestinian National
Council have begun to backtrack on their previous position against Arafat regarding
his visit to Egypt.
b. Arafat's meeting with Hosni Mubarak was intended to be a card in Arafat's hand when
visiting Jordan in the future, despite the media campaign launched by Syria
and Libya.
c. Yasser Arafat's visit to Egypt is one in which King Hussein cannot concede
anything essential regarding the Palestinian cause, but rather to gain Egypt's support for
the positions of the Organization.
d. Egypt conducted negotiations with Israel and the regime of Hafez al-Assad directly and
indirectly to resolve the Palestinian cause.
2. The second source:-
a. Arafat's visit to Cairo was agreed upon before he went to Tripoli,
and the committee is taking two directions, which are:
First: The first direction is led by Khalid al-Hassan and Hani al-Hassan, which is to proceed
with the matter of federation with Jordan.
Salem to ⟦illegible⟧
⟦illegible⟧ 8 / 2 / 1982
14
2
130-244
S1
Secret
( 1 - 1 )
Council of
Revolutionary Command
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Secret
Number: ⟦sh1⟧
Date: / / 198
Information
Second: The second trend says the first trend is incorrect and says
the organization must open a new page by restoring the relationship
with Egypt. This trend is led by Abu Ammar and Faruq al-Qaddumi
and their opinion in this trend is as follows:-
(1) Not surrendering to the American plan.
(2) Returning Egypt to be considered a strategic depth for the organization.
(3) Getting out of Saudi hegemony.
(4) Going to Jordan from a position of strength.
B. Abu Ammar desired to score a point against Hani al-Hassan and Khalid al-Hassan of the
Saudi trend.
Please be informed... with appreciation.
For/ Director General of the Secret Service
Copy to /
M. M. T. A. / with appreciation.
- 2 -
Secret
⟦mark⟧
General Secret Service Directorate
Directorate ( )
Division ( )
Form No. (2)
(A)
Opinion and Decision
Assistant Director General
198 / /
Division Manager
198 / /
Implementation of the proposal
Waiting for Cairo's response
Head of Section
2/5/1984
Kamal ⟦...⟧
⟦illegible⟧
2/5/1984
95
Mr. Director of the First Division
Subject / Information
1- We were previously informed by the daily news report for 11/2/1982 that the Egyptian government provided assistance
military aid to the Fatah organization (Arafat's group), and the source was from Abu Musa's group, as he observed an Egyptian
general transport ship docked near the port of Tripoli carrying military equipment.
2- The matter was followed up with the Cairo and Beirut stations, and we were informed of the details.
3- 1- The Cairo station replied that the accuracy of the above information was not confirmed despite extensive investigation by their sources.
4- A letter was provided to the Cairo embassy to follow up on refugees in Egypt and Yasser Arafat's recent visit to Egypt
⟦...⟧ regarding waiting for the response from Cairo.
5- The Beirut station replied regarding the information as follows:
a- The information contained in our letter regarding the aid is correct.
b- The Egyptian military aid to Arafat during his presence in Tripoli was not limited to ammunition, but rather a military
warship participated on the night of 11/11-12 by shelling Mount Turbol located to the east of the Beddawi camp, which was
controlled by Abu Musa's group, and the shelling caused significant casualties among the ranks of the dissidents.
c- This reinforced the belief that the warship that shelled was Egyptian, and we are increasingly providing the estimation
⟦...⟧ regarding the presence of an Egyptian warship that had stopped at Port Said when Arafat and his gunmen were evacuated from Tripoli
⟦...⟧ at the time and headed towards Saudi Arabian ports.
6- The above information in paragraph (a11) indicates the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is carried out by the ambassador
Kuwaiti policy in Beirut and among the dissidents, the Kuwaiti forces, specifically one of the outsiders
Head of Lebanese Intelligence, and she will provide us with our sources in Cairo.
Please be kind enough to review and your order to refer the information to ⟦...⟧
Raad Hamid ⟦...⟧
History Department
4/2/1984
Council of
Revolutionary Command
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Secret
Number: Sh1 / 2887
Date: 1/28/1984
Notice to / Directorate of Information and General Records
1. We attach herewith the statement issued by the members of the Palestinian National Council in Jordan and the names
of those who signed it as they represent the opposition party to Yasser Arafat :-
2. The members who did not condemn Arafat and did not sign the statement are :-
a. Abdul Hamid Al-Sayeh
b. Rajab Al-Tamimi
c. Abdul Hamid Al-Qudsi
d. Saadat Al-Houran
e. Mohammad Istail (Abu Adnan)
f. Abdul Aziz Saqr
g. Najib Al-Ahmed
h. Naim Al-Khatib
i. Hanna Nasser
Please be informed ..... with appreciation.
Attachments
The statement with a list of names
For / Director General of the Secret Service
1/26
Attachments
(1-1)
Secret
⟦illegible⟧
⟦illegible⟧
Secret
⟦illegible⟧
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
Revolutionary Command Council
Intelligence Presidency
49 Media M 4 Sh 3
22 / 1 / 1984
To / First Division - Palestine
One of our sources, whose reliability is good, provided us with the following:
1. A report on Arafat's visit to Egypt
2. An article by Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah
For your kind review .. with appreciation .
Attachments
Report number (2)
⟦illegible signature⟧
Director of the Third Division
2 / 1
For files
27
Revolutionary
Command Council
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Secret
Number: Sh1 / 2229
Date: 1/22/1984
Announcement
To / Directorate of General Information and Records
Below is the information received by us from the Amman station
During the meeting of the Jordanian Minister of Information with the Information Directors, he mentioned that Yasser Arafat's visit to Cairo
means that the PLO realized it had lost the military option and has turned toward a political
solution and acting according to the following:
1. Working towards Egypt's return to the Arab fold, strengthening its position against Israel, and attempting to overturn
the Camp David Accords.
2. Acceptance of working to demand the establishment of the Civil Administration.
3. Cooperation with Jordan and authorizing King Hussein to conduct negotiations on the Reagan Initiative.
4. Sorting out the Arab position clearly, because proposing Egypt's return will force everyone to declare
their positions. Thus, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen will stand on the opposing side, and likewise
the positions of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf states will become clear in a practical manner after the fluidity
in which they were fluctuating.
5. America's discomfort with Egypt's return.
Please be informed... with appreciation.
p.p./ Director General of the Secret Service
1/22
(1-1)
Secret
Arafat's visit to
Egypt
⟦illegible⟧
Revolutionary Command Council
Intelligence Service
General Secret Service Directorate
Secret
No.: Sh4 / 2159
Date: 1/22/1984
⟦Information and Records Directorate⟧
Number 1444
Date 1/22
To / General Information and Records Directorate
We are referring to you herewith a number of newsletters and regular statements issued by the
party organization of the ruling party's organization in Prague.
Please kindly review and benefit from them.. with appreciation.
Attachments
01 Sh4 / Sh8 Statement on the dangers of the
American-Zionist alliance
02 Sh4 / Sh8 Statement on Arafat's visit to Cairo
03 Sh4 / Sh8 The Masses
⟦signature⟧
on behalf of/ Director General of the Secret Service
130
244
M 1
14 + 2
(1 - 1)
Secret
Referred herewith attached
⟦illegible⟧
Taking necessary action
Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party
Organization of Czechoslovakia
Statement regarding Arafat's visit to Cairo
⟦line⟧
Comrades, free Arabs,
The final mask has fallen, and the truth has become clear as the sun, and everyone has become aware of why Yasser
Arafat withdrew from fighting the Zionists in Southern Lebanon during the Israeli invasion, and why he raised the same weapon against
those who opposed him in his political line, and why he committed heinous massacres against our Palestinian people in the camps of Nahr
al-Bared and al-Beddawi, and encouraged Palestinians to kill their Palestinian brothers; why Yasser Arafat led a
bloody and hysterical campaign against the Lebanese national and progressive forces represented by the Lebanese National Salvation Front,
and committed a massacre against the Lebanese Communist Party, and why Arafat led a campaign of hatred and ingratitude against
the people and army of Arab Syria, which offered and still offers the flower of its youth and the best of its cadres on the altar of the Palestinian
cause. The essence of the independent Palestinian national decision that Yasser wants has now become clear
Arafat...??
Comrades,
Our great party, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, has defined its clear position toward everything happening in the Arab
arena and warned of the dangers of the path followed by Yasser Arafat; Syria, which preserves Arab national
security, is also the one defending the honor, dignity, pride, and rights of the Arab nation. The honorable stance
taken by Syria during the Zionist invasion of Lebanon and against the surrenderist path for which Yasser Arafat paved the way
proves this. Our party and our masses have known that Yasser Arafat exploded his hatred against Syria,
negotiated with King Hussein, agreed with the emerging regime in Baghdad, and flirted with all the client regimes in the Arab region,
and attacked the Soviet Union with the sole aim of securing the path for the Camp David approach and passing the Reagan project
and selling the Palestinian cause and Palestinian blood cheaply in the slave market, the market of surrender. Yasser Arafat's visit
to the Egyptian regime, which is still stained with the shame of Camp David and which continues to suppress
the Egyptian national and progressive forces, shows the accuracy of all our previous analysis and requires all Arab national and progressive
forces that have not defined their final position on Yasser Arafat's line to immediately take up their responsibilities
before the masses surpass them.
The immediate condemnation expressed by the Arab liberation movement in general and the Palestinian revolution in particular
of Arafat's visit to Egypt, considering it a betrayal of the Palestinian cause, shows Arafat's isolation and his lack of representation of the Palestinian
revolution. The children of Palestine and its people, who were waiting for the Christmas and New Year's
gift from Yasser Arafat to be the correction of his political line, will find in their hands only a gift called Camp David,
the symbol of surrender and betrayal. But we in Arab Syria say to the Palestinian Arab people and to the children of
Palestine that our gifts to them will be, as they always were, more steadfastness and more determination to liberate them
from the yoke of Zionism and imperialism, no matter the sacrifices.
Long live the Arab liberation movement that confronted the policies of surrender and the Camp David path and which
will confront the remnants of Camp David among the agents and traitors, headed by Yasser Arafat.
Long live the global support for our nation's causes, especially from the group of socialist countries, headed by the friendly
Soviet Union.
Long live the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and its Secretary-General, the struggling comrade Hafez al-Assad, the vanguard
of the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-reactionary struggle.
Command of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party
Organization in Czechoslovakia
⟦illegible⟧
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Amman
Number: 49 / 1
Date: 17 / 1 / 1984
52
⟦line⟧
7 / 2
Secret
Ministry of Foreign Affairs / General Affairs Division M3
Subject / Information
⟦line⟧
1- We attach herewith the statement issued by 9 members of the Palestinian National Council
in Jordan and the names of those who signed it as they represent the opposition front
to Yasser Arafat.
2- As for the members who did not sign for Arafat and did not sign the statement, they are:
a- Abdul Hamid al-Sayeh.
b- Rajib al-Tamimi.
c- Abdul Hamid al-Qudsi.
d- Saadat al-Houran.
e- Muhammad Ismail (Abu Adnan)
f- Abdul Aziz Saqr.
g- Najib al-Ahmad.
h- Naim al-Khatib
i- Hanna Nasser
Please be informed... with appreciation
Attachments
General Affairs Division
M
Number
Secret
7-10
C L
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Beirut
Public Affairs Section
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
BEIRUT
Secret
94 85
Khaled
No.: 87
Date: / / 1984
To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Public Affairs Section
Subject: Information
Your letter Sh1 / 1545 on 11/6/1983.
-1 The information contained in your above letter is correct.
-2 Egyptian military assistance to Yasser Arafat during his presence in Tripoli was not limited to ammunition, but rather a military warship participated on the night of 11/16-17/83 in shelling Mount Turbul, located to the east of the Beddawi camp, which was controlled by the Abu Musa group, and the shelling caused numerous casualties among the dissidents.
-3 Three days after this shelling, it became clear that the warship that carried out the shelling was Egyptian and that it was present in the territorial waters between Cyprus and Lebanon, and it and others were qualified for a rapid operation aimed at evacuating Arafat and his aides from Tripoli when necessary at the time, based on a request from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
-4 The source of this information is No. (811), who works as a correspondent for the Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa newspaper in Beirut, as he indicated that the source of information is Kuwait, specifically Ahmed Al-Jarallah, editor-in-chief of Al-Siyasa newspaper, and it is derived from his sources in Cairo ⟦line⟧
Please be informed, with appreciation.
Director
Public Affairs Section
Sh1
1/23
Statement issued by members of the Palestinian National Council
in Jordan
⟦line⟧
We, the members of the Palestinian National Council in Jordan, received with great surprise and complete
condemnation the unilateral step that falls outside Palestinian legitimacy taken by Brother Yasser Arafat by visiting
Cairo and meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the successor of Sadat, who betrayed the Palestinian
national cause, signed the surrender agreement with the Israeli enemy, and plunged Egypt into the swamp of
dependency on American imperialism.
The visit and meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who adheres to the treasonous Camp David Accords
and continues Sadat's approach of submitting to the will of the Israeli enemy and linking Arab Egypt to the wheel of
the imperialist policy of the United States, constitutes an extension of the approach of unilateralism and deviation from the decisions of the National
Councils of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its legitimate institutions, and inflicts the greatest damage on the unity and independent
decision of the organization, providing free validation for the treasonous Camp David Accords.
The members of the Palestinian National Council in Jordan, while firmly and steadfastly defending the unity of
the Palestine Liberation Organization and its legitimate institutions, and resisting with all their might all attempts to bypass the P.L.O. as
the sole legitimate representative and all forms of external interference in its internal affairs and attempts to contain its
independent decision, affirm their determination to continue the struggle to protect Palestinian legitimacy from the dangers of the policy of unilateralism,
confusion, and division.
The members of the Palestinian National Council in Jordan, while affirming their rejection and condemnation of this visit
and the resulting consequences, renew their commitment to the legitimate institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, foremost among them
the Palestinian National Council, and call, from a position of national responsibility, upon the factions of the revolution, the Palestinian masses,
and all national and progressive forces and figures in the occupied homeland and abroad to unite ranks
in defense of the P.L.O., the sole legitimate representative of our people, and in defense of the gains and victories achieved by
our people under the revolution and the Palestinian rifle, and to deny the opportunity to the forces hostile to the rights of our people
to return to their homeland, self-determination, and the building of their independent state on their national soil, and to thwart the hostile plot
aimed at luring the Organization into the swamp of American capitulatory solutions and their reactionary adjuncts, foremost
among them the liquidationist Reagan plan.
Amman on 1/23/1983
Lawyer Ibrahim Bakr
Lawyer Yasser Mahmoud
⟦illegible⟧
Lawyer Rashid Al-Ramli
Lawyer Kamal Nasser
Lawyer Ahmed Al-Jamal
Mustafa Al-Khamis
Ahmed Saleh Shash
Nabila Taha
Sami Khalil
Mansour Abdullah
⟦line⟧
⟦illegible⟧
Lawyer Ibrahim Abbas
⟦illegible⟧
Hamdi Taha
Abdul Jawad Saleh
Bashir ⟦illegible⟧
Sayed Rizk Ali
Abdullah Abu Malwa
Lawyer Al-Jawarani
Ali Kamal
Aisha Oudeh
Dr. Mustafa Melhem
Atta Al-Wahba
Abdul Rahman Abu Habbat
⟦illegible text in blue ink background⟧
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Amman
52
⟦line⟧
Number :: 1 / 481
Date :: 1/17/1984
Secret
Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Department of General Affairs ⟦illegible⟧
Subject / Information
Number 811 M informed us on ⟦illegible⟧ of the following:-
A number of members of the Executive Committee and members of the Palestinian National Council began
to retreat from their previous position and started supporting Arafat's visit to Cairo
and aligning with him in an initiative despite the counter-media campaign carried out
by the Syrian and Libyan regimes.. The information mentioned that the visit
to Cairo before the visit to Jordan comes so that Arafat has a strong card
and Egyptian support, as Arafat has prior knowledge of King
Hussein's statements and that he (the King) will not concede anything and he is acting
to serve the Palestinian cause, which forced Arafat to visit in order to
gain Egyptian support first before taking other steps towards
the Palestinian cause, and it is mentioned and stated that all Jordanian circles
support the King's step and the return of parliamentary life, which is considered, according to
Palestinian and Jordanian opinion, the decision was originally taken at this
critical time that the Palestinian revolution is going through and as it is imposed upon it
Palestinians mention that the King's step is against the Palestine Liberation Organization
its leadership and its ambitions, which will close the door to any
Jordanian-Palestinian alliance to coordinate positions against the occupation.. in addition to paving
the way for the King to enter into negotiations with the Zionist entity for the return
of the West Bank to Jordan.. On the other hand, negotiations took place
with Israel, Lebanon, and the Assad regime regarding Peshawar, and it is not excluded by this
claim any disregard by the Arab countries for the problem
2- Number 809 M informed us on ⟦illegible⟧ regarding the same subject the following:-
(1-2)
Secret
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Amman
Number: / / 48
Date: 7 / 1 / 1984
The subject of Arafat's visit to Egypt was previously discussed by the Fatah Central Committee
in Tunisia before Arafat's departure for Tripoli two months ago
where the committee discussed the possibilities of leaving Lebanon and the next stage
Two trends emerged in the Central Committee, namely:
A- The first trend says it is necessary to go to Jordan if the exit is completed
from Lebanon and not necessarily to go to Egypt. This trend is led by Khalid
al-Hassan and Hani al-Hassan.
B- The other trend says that going to Jordan is incorrect because this is what is required
within the American plan, i.e., weakening the organization militarily and throwing it into
the Jordanian lap, and this is what was planned to strike the centralism and the organization
and that the exit must be to Yemen and the Arab Maghreb and that a new page should be opened
and the return of the relationship with Egypt. This trend is led by Abu Ammar and supported by
Abu al-Lutf, and going to Egypt achieves the following:
First - Not surrendering to the American plan.
Second - Restoring Egypt to become a strategic depth for the organization.
Third - Getting out from under Syrian hegemony.
Fourth - That going to Jordan is not intended for negotiations from a position of strength
as would be the case in the relationship with Egypt.
The Central Committee differed on these two matters and they were left at the time
for the future, and it seems that Abu Ammar took his individual step by going
to Egypt without consulting the members of the Central Committee for the following reasons:
1- That those who support him will continue to trust him and continue their support for him.
2- That Abu Ammar wanted to score a point of anger against Khalid al-Hassan
towards the Syrian line, and this line which has no organizational roots
or military roots within Fatah. This is due to Abu Ammar's conviction that the others
Secret
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
Embassy of the Iraqi Republic
Amman
Number: / / 48
Date: 17 / 1 / 1984
Khaled and Hani al-Hassan were executing a Saudi and Turkish plan for two months
He placed his forces at the mercy of the Syrians .. so that Syria could defeat him
militarily ..
Please be informed .. with appreciation
⟦illegible⟧
Public Affairs Division
(3)
Secret