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1- The Assyrian assault on the officers in Mosul
IJA 2100
Report Regarding Attack by Assyrians on Officers in Mosul
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These are archival documents from the Iraqi government and include a report dated May 28, 1933 from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior regarding the attack by Assyrians on officers in Mosul in 1933. It mentions Mar Shamun, the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, who was being held under house arrest.
AI English Translation, Pages 1-25
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Secret and Urgent Ministry of Defense Baghdad 27/ML/15 ⟦illegible⟧ Number: 778 Date: 3 Safar 1352 AH 28 May 1933 AD To: Ministry of Interior Baghdad Subject: Assyrian assault on officers in Mosul. Reference to the correspondence ending with the letter of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, Secret Number 1689 and dated 26 Muharram 1352 and 21/5/1933: Following the disturbing telegrams received by this Ministry from the Defense of Mosul regarding the assault by Assyrian rioters in Mosul on some army officers, we dispatched Lieutenant General Taha al-Hashimi, Chief of Staff of the Army, on the 23rd of this month to Mosul to investigate the case and submit a report regarding it. The aforementioned Lieutenant General returned on the 24th of this month after completing his mission. I am sending you herewith a copy of the report he prepared for your information, requesting that the strictest measures be taken to identify the aggressors and bring them to justice and to prevent any incident of this kind in the future. ⟦signature⟧ Minister of Defense 759 29/5 ⟦signature⟧ 29/5 Translated M. ⟦signature⟧ 3/6 Copy (with a copy of the report) to: Secretariat of the Council of Ministers Presidency of the Royal Court Ministry of Finance Baghdad. Sabi 28/5/01
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- 2 - Second - That armed soldiers from the Levies used to come at night to the house of Mar Shimun and sleep there. After the attention of the Commander of the British Air Force was drawn to this, they came without jackets and also slept in the house. Third - That the Levies stationed a sentry in the parade ground adjacent to the old Army barracks, and the sentry is changed three times regularly. He believes that the purpose of stationing the sentry is to observe the Iraqi Army units during their exercises for fear that they might surprise the Assyrian quarters in the district, so he could inform the Levy soldiers of that. 3 - The Commander applied two phases of the Mosul defense plan. The first phase requires soldiers to remain in the barracks and the withdrawal of short leaves, and the second phase requires the distribution of ammunition to the soldiers. He ordered the construction of towers around the ammunition depot at Bab Sinjar. This construction has no relation to the plan, as it appears that the ammunition depot needs these towers for its protection when necessary. The Area Commander did not inform the Mutasarrif of Mosul about his application of the two phases of the defense plan, as he considered that to be within his authority and not related to execution. 4 - As for what concerns the relationship of the Area Commander with the Liaison Officer, Colonel White, General Bakr Sidqi stated that he informed the Liaison Officer about the issue of the sentry and requested him to inquire about the reason for his presence from the Levy force. He told him that he was going and would return after a short period to inform him of the result. After an hour and a half had passed, he did not return. When he met with the Area Commander, he stated that the British Squadron Leader and the Levy Commander knew nothing about the sentry, and he thinks that the Assyrian soldier came to watch the training of the monitored units. However, the Area Commander informed him that the guard was changed at specific times three times, and it is not reasonable for the soldiers to be mere spectators. On the second day, Colonel White informed him that the British Squadron Leader suggests placing the parade ground outside the roaming limits of the Levy soldiers. General Bakr Sidqi replied that this was the responsibility of the Squadron Leader, not his responsibility. Then Colonel White mentioned that the Squadron Leader suggests sending a patrol of British soldiers to guard the parade ground. The Area Commander was disgusted by this proposal, which he considered an insult to the Iraqi Army, so he asked him in his capacity as (Liaison Officer), an experienced soldier, whether he sees this proposal as reasonable.
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⟦line⟧ - 1 - ⟦line⟧ A day later, Colonel White arrived and asked the Area Commander to provide him with information to inform the Inspector General. The Area Commander replied that the information available to him pertained to the Barzan area and he had no other information, and the Liaison Officer would have to obtain information about the country from other sources. It appears that this answer angered him, so he asked the Area Commander if he could be relied upon, and the Commander replied that he could not be relied upon. Accordingly, the Liaison Officer left the area, came to Baghdad, and presented the case to the Inspector General. What appeared from the statements of both parties was the existence of a difference of opinion between the Area Commander and the Liaison Officer for a long time, and that the Area Commander believed that the Liaison Officer, in his statements regarding the guard issue, intended to be insulting, which made him not rely on him. After that, I visited the Governor, and the Administrative Inspector was with him. He reported that investigations are ongoing regarding the stone-throwing case, and they have not concluded yet. I reviewed the police reports investigating the case, and they all confirmed that stones were being thrown at the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib and the house of the school principal, and at the houses from which the police were keeping watch, but they did not establish the direction of the throwing despite all the measures taken, and they did not prevent the throwing. After that, the Police Director and his assistant arrived and supported the reports. It appears from the investigation that the stones were being thrown accurately and hitting from a nearby location. The Police Director notes the possibility of personal reasons between the officers' families that led to the stone-throwing. However, the reality does not support this observation, as it is difficult for the families to continue throwing despite police surveillance. As for the Administrative Inspector, he reported that the investigations of the British Air Force Commander General showed that the Levies soldier was standing in the parade ground to observe the case of his cousin, who was accused by the government. I met with the Liaison Officer, Colonel White, and he confirmed that the British Squadron Leader and the Commander of the Levies force knew nothing about the soldier standing in the parade ground and the soldiers who stayed overnight in Mar Shimun's house. And that he did not mention to the Area Commander that the Squadron Leader suggested sending a patrol of British soldiers to guard the parade ground; rather, what he said was the Squadron Leader's suggestion to send a patrol to inspect the Levies soldiers and arrest them.
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- 4 - I sought clarification from him as to the source from which he learned of the taking of weapons from the Assyrian soldiers serving in the Iraqi army units and placing them in the warehouses; he stated that he heard that from word of mouth. I replied to him that there was absolutely no truth to that. 8 - At fifteen-thirty hours, I met with the British Squadron Leader Chamberlayne in his office in the presence of the Commander of the Northern Area and the Liaison Officer. The Squadron Leader expressed his deep distress at the conviction of the Northern Area Commander that the Commander of the Levy Force and the Squadron Leader had knowledge of the placement of guards at the parade ground and the sending of Levy soldiers to the house of Mar Shimun, and he emphasized that they absolutely did not know that. And that when he heard of the incident, he met with the Area Commander at the Military Club and told him that he was ready to assist him in arresting the Levy soldiers and that he suggested sending a patrol of British soldiers for this purpose. The Liaison Officer confirmed that. General Bakr Sidqi replied that what he said was: as far as he knows, discipline in the Levy units is strict; therefore, he cannot imagine how the guards could be stationed and soldiers leave the Levy camp and spend the night at the house of Mar Shimun without the British officers having knowledge of that. He still considers that inconceivable. When I drew General Bakr Sidqi's attention to the possibility of the soldiers leaving with the permission of their Assyrian officers without the knowledge of their British commander, and I explained to the Squadron Leader that General Bakr Sidqi's conviction arose from the fact that if the guards were stationed by order and the soldiers were sent to the house of Mar Shimun by instruction, it is not reasonable that this would occur without the knowledge of the British Commander, and that it is possible that the Assyrian officers or Assyrian non-commissioned officers instructed that without the knowledge of the Commander. And that the Diana incident last summer showed that the Assyrian soldiers and their officers are able to hide a conspiracy from the British officers. General Bakr Sidqi stated that he does not know the authorities granted to the Assyrian officers regarding giving permission to the soldiers ⟦...⟧ etc. And if there was authority granted to them, it is possible that the guards were stationed and the soldiers were sent to the house of Mar Shimun by instruction from them.
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9 - Conclusion: What I have concluded from the investigations: First - That Leader Bakr Sidqi and the officers firmly believe that the throwing of stones was orchestrated by the Assyrians and that the establishment of the guard and the sending of soldiers were done with the knowledge of the British officers. Second - That the police showed great incompetence in the matter and did not use their influence to prevent the throwing and arrest the perpetrators. It was within their power to prevent that and settle the issue without it expanding, thereby confirming the conviction of the area commander and his officers that it was orchestrated. Third - The Governor did not pressure the police to use all their authority to settle the issue. Despite the repeated requests of the area commander to settle the matter, the Governor was satisfied with referring it to the police and waiting. When the area commander asked him to confirm to him in writing that the families of the officers, if they returned to their homes, would not be pelted with stones, the Governor did not confirm that. 10 - My personal conviction: (a) There are several indications that the stone-throwing was orchestrated, intended to stir up unrest by insulting the officers of the Iraqi army. (b) It is possible that a guard was placed in the parade ground to monitor Iraqi army units and Levy soldiers were sent to the house of Mar Shimun to guard him or to throw stones without the knowledge of the British officers. (c) The successive incidents led to the agitation of the nerves of the officers and soldiers and it was likely that unrest would have occurred had the officers not maintained their composure and received the insult with an open heart. (d) The Governor of Mosul confirmed in all his previous and subsequent notifications that Mar Shimun bears a grudge against the Iraqi government and is inciting his group to violations, and the area commander was informed of these signals by virtue of his position and through meetings and discussions with the Governor. The stone-throwing incident was among those that supported those signals. And when it was followed by the guard incident and the arrival of Levy soldiers at night to the house of Mar Shimun and the weakness of the police in arresting the perpetrator, it was confirmed to the area commander that the matter was orchestrated. So he believed that whoever confronted him in such
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- 6 - this position to implement the two phases of the Mosul defense plan to be prepared for emergencies according to his claim. But he erred in implementing the second phase which requires distributing ammunition without informing the Mutasarrif. As it is permissible for him to implement the first plan, which is a preliminary measure to prevent an incident by confining soldiers to their barracks. There is no doubt that distributing ammunition to the soldiers and establishing towers around the ammunition depot at a time when nerves were tense increased the criticality of the situation. The highest administrative official must have knowledge of the consequences as he is more aware of the degree of agitation among the inhabitants. He may see in the implementation of the plan's phases a great danger to security. 11- It happened that another incident occurred which intensified the misunderstanding between the Area Commander and the British Squadron Leader. It was the custom in the past for the guard to salute the Commander of the British Air Force in Mosul when he visited the Mutasarrifate during official celebrations and on His Majesty the King's birthday. When the guard was sent to the Government House to salute the consuls as stated in the Iraqi Army orders, the Guard Commander asked the Area Commander whether to salute the Air Force Commander when he comes to visit the Mutasarrifate, and the Area Commander replied that there was no need for that because the army orders do not authorize it. Yes, the army orders do not allow the guard to salute except for the individuals whose positions are mentioned in those orders, and they do not include British commanders employed in the British forces stationed in Iraq. It is regrettable that the failure to salute took place at a time when nerves were tense and suspicion was widespread. 10D 28 / 5 / 1933
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Copy of the secret report numbered 11208 and dated May 24, 1933, submitted by the Chief of Staff of the Army to His Excellency the Minister of Defense. Pursuant to your verbal order, I went yesterday to Mosul by plane and returned from there. I left Al-Hinaidi airport at five-thirty and arrived in Mosul at seven-thirty. I left Mosul at sixteen-thirty and arrived at Al-Hinaidi airport at nineteen-thirty. 1 - I met for the first time with the Commander of the Northern Area, Brigadier Bakr Sidqi, and inquired from him about the incidents that occurred in Mosul. He stated that the throwing of stones at the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib began on the night of 11/12 May and continued for six days without interruption, despite the fact that the police set up observers in his house and the adjacent houses, placed secret police, and sent the commissioner and the assistant to investigate. The stone-throwing led to the wounding and bruising of some women, and it affected the house of the director of the Al-Ma'arif school adjacent to the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib. The aforementioned Lieutenant Colonel identified one of the throwers on the first night, who is Shlimon, so he registered the case with the police. The discipline soldiers accompanying the police and the homeowners confirm that the stones were being thrown from the house of Mar Shimun and the house of Shlimon. Some of the police witnessed this and mentioned it verbally in the presence of several officers. The school director first left his house, followed by Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib leaving his house and other officers in the same neighborhood. When the Area Commander saw that the Assyrian boys began opening the door of his house during the day at different times and behaving rowdily, he was forced to leave his house as well, which is in the same neighborhood. 2 - The Area Commander believes that the throwing was organized by the Assyrians living in that neighborhood at the instigation of Mar Shimun, and that the police did not use their influence to arrest the trespassers and prevent the throwing due to their weakness and failure to assess the situation. He supports his conviction with the following points: First - Despite the presence of the police and their monitoring of the houses at night, the throwing was continuous and sometimes hit the houses from which the assistant police officer and the commissioner were monitoring. It is certain that the stones were being thrown from a nearby house not exceeding the courtyard of the adjacent houses in which each of the Brigade Lieutenant Colonel, the school director, Major Abdul Qadir Al-Azzawi, Mar Shimun, Shlimon, and Sadiq Shimun reside.