Page 2
1- The Assyrian assault on the officers in Mosul
IJA 2100
Report Regarding Attack by Assyrians on Officers in Mosul
View interactive document pageDescription
These are archival documents from the Iraqi government and include a report dated May 28, 1933 from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior regarding the attack by Assyrians on officers in Mosul in 1933. It mentions Mar Shamun, the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, who was being held under house arrest.
AI en Translation, Pages 1-25
Page 3
Ministry of Defense Baghdad Secret and Urgent ⟦illegible⟧ 27/ML/15 Number: 778 Date: 3 Safar 1352 AH 28 May 1933 AD To: Ministry of Interior Baghdad Subject: Assyrian assault on officers in Mosul. Reference to the communication ending with the letter of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, Secret, Number 1689 dated 26 Muharram 1352 and 21 / 5 / 1933: Following the disturbing telegrams received by this Ministry from the defense of Mosul regarding the assault by Assyrian rioters in Mosul on some Army officers, we dispatched Lieutenant General Taha al-Hashimi, Chief of Staff of the Army, on the 23rd of this month to Mosul to investigate the case and submit a report regarding it. The aforementioned Lieutenant General returned on the 24th of this month after completing his mission. I am sending you herewith a copy of the report he prepared for your information thereon, requesting that the strictest measures be taken to identify the aggressors and bring them to justice, and to prevent any incident of this kind in the future. ⟦signature⟧ Minister of Defense ⟦illegible⟧ 759 29/5 ⟦illegible⟧ 29/5 Translated ⟦illegible⟧ Copy (with a copy of the report) to: Secretariat of the Council of Ministers Head of the Royal Diwan Ministry of Finance Baghdad. Sabi 1 / 28 / 5
Page 4
- 2 - Second - Armed soldiers from the Levy were coming at night to the house of Mar Shimun and sleeping in it. After the attention of the Commander of the British Air Force was drawn to this, they came without jackets and also slept in the house. Third - The Levy established a sentry in the parade ground adjacent to the old Army barracks and the sentry is changed three times regularly, and he believes that the purpose of establishing the guard is to monitor the units of the Iraqi Army during their exercises for fear that they might surprise the Assyrians' quarter in the area so that the Levy soldiers would be informed of that. 3 - The Commander applied two phases of the Mosul defense plan; the first phase requires the soldiers to remain in the barracks and the withdrawal of short leaves, and the second phase requires the distribution of ammunition to the soldiers. And he ordered the construction of towers around the ammunition depot in Bab Sinjar. This construction has no relation to the plan, as it appears that the ammunition depot requires these towers for its protection when needed. The District Commander did not inform the Mutasarrif of Mosul about his application of the two phases of the defense plan, as he considered that within his jurisdiction and not related to implementation. 4 - As for what concerns the relationship of the District Commander with the Liaison Officer, Colonel White, General Bakr Sidqi stated that he informed the Liaison Officer about the guard issue and requested of him to inquire from the Levy force about the reason for its establishment, so he told him he was going and would return after a short period to inform him of the result. After an hour and a half had passed, he did not return, and when he met with the District Commander, he stated that the British Squadron Leader and the Levy Commander knew nothing about the sentry and he thinks that the Assyrian soldier came to watch the training of the Iraqi units. However, the District Commander informed him that the guard changed at specific times three times and that it is not plausible that the soldiers were spectators. On the second day, Colonel White informed him that the British Squadron Leader suggests placing the parade ground outside the boundaries of the Levy soldiers' movements, so General Bakr Sidqi replied that this was the responsibility of the Squadron Leader, not his, then Colonel White mentioned that the Squadron Leader suggests sending a patrol of British soldiers to guard the parade field, so the District Commander was disgusted by this proposal which he considered an insult to the Iraqi Army, and he asked him in his capacity as a (Liaison Officer) and an expert soldier, whether he sees this proposal as reasonable.
Page 5
- 1 - A day later, Colonel White came and asked the area commander to provide him with information to inform the Inspector General. The area commander replied that the available information he had related to the Barzan area and he had no other information, and the liaison officer could obtain information about the country from other sources. It appears that this answer angered him, so he asked the area commander whether he could be relied upon, and the commander replied that he could not be relied upon. Accordingly, the liaison officer left the area, came to Baghdad, and presented the case to the Inspector General. What appeared from the statements of both parties was the existence of a difference of opinion between the area commander and the liaison officer for a long time, and that the area commander believed that the liaison officer, through his statements regarding the issue of the guards, intended to be insulting, which made him not rely on him. - 5 After that, I visited the Mutasarrif (Governor), and the Administrative Inspector was with him. He informed me that the investigations regarding the incident of stone-throwing are ongoing and have not concluded yet. I reviewed the police reports investigating the case, and they all confirmed that stones were being thrown at the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib and the house of the school principal and at the houses where the police were keeping watch, but they did not determine the direction of the throwing despite all the measures taken, nor did they prevent the throwing. After that, the Police Director and his assistant arrived and supported the reports. It appears from the investigation that the stones were thrown accurately and hit targets from a nearby place. - 6 The Police Director notes the possibility of personal reasons between the officers' families leading to the stone-throwing. However, the reality does not support this observation, as it is difficult for families to continue throwing despite police surveillance. As for the Administrative Inspector, he informed that the investigations of the British Royal Air Force Commander General showed that the Levies soldier was standing in the parade ground to monitor the lawsuit of his cousin, who was accused by the government. - 7 I met with the liaison officer, Colonel White, and he confirmed that the British squadron leader and the commander of the Levies force know nothing about the soldier standing in the parade ground and the soldiers who stayed overnight in the house of Mar Shimun. And that he did not mention to the area commander that the squadron leader proposed sending a patrol of British soldiers to guard the parade ground; rather, what he said was the squadron leader's proposal to send a patrol to inspect the Levies soldiers and arrest them.
Page 7
- 5 - 9 - Summary: What I have concluded from the investigations: First - That Leader Bakr Sidqi and the officers firmly believe that the throwing of stones was orchestrated by the Assyrians, and that setting up the guard and sending the soldiers occurred with the knowledge of the British officers. Second - That the police showed great inability in the matter and did not use their influence to prevent the throwing and arrest the transgressors. It was within their power to prevent that and settle the issue without it expanding, thereby confirming the conviction of the area commander and his officers that it was orchestrated. Third - The Mutasarrif (Governor) did not pressure the police to use all their authority to settle the issue. Despite the successive appeals of the area commander to settle the case, the Mutasarrif was satisfied with referring it to the police and waiting. When the area commander asked him to confirm to him in writing that the families of the officers would not be pelted with stones if they returned to their homes, the Mutasarrif did not confirm that. 10 - My personal conviction: (A) There are several indications suggesting that the stone-throwing was orchestrated, intended to provoke unrest by insulting the officers of the Iraqi army. (B) A guard could be placed in the parade ground to monitor Iraqi army units, and Levy soldiers could be sent to Mar Shimun's house to guard him or to throw stones without the knowledge of the British officers. (C) The successive incidents led to the agitation of the nerves of the officers and soldiers, and it was likely that unrest would have occurred if the officers had not maintained their composure and received the insult with a broad chest. (D) The Mutasarrif of Mosul confirmed in all his previous and subsequent notices that Mar Shimun bears a grudge against the Iraqi government and is inciting his group to violations. The area commander was informed of these notices by virtue of his position and through meetings and deliberations with the Mutasarrif. The stone-throwing incident was among the things that supported those notices. When it was followed by the incident of the guard and the arrival of Levy soldiers at night at the house of Mar Shimun, and the weakness of the police in arresting the transgressor, it became certain to the area commander that the matter was orchestrated. So he believed that his duty in such
Page 8
- 6 - this position to implement the two phases of the Mosul defense plan to be prepared for emergencies, according to his claim. But he erred in implementing the second phase which required distributing ammunition without informing the Mutasarrif. Since it is permissible for him to implement the first plan, which is a preliminary measure to prevent an incident by confining soldiers to their barracks. There is no doubt that distributing ammunition to the soldiers and establishing towers around the ammunition depot at a time when nerves were frayed only increased the criticality of the situation. It is necessary for the highest administrative official to have prior knowledge, as he is more aware of the degree of agitation among the populace. He might see in the implementation of the plan's phases a great danger to security. 11- It happened that another incident occurred which intensified the misunderstanding between the Area Commander and the British Squadron Leader. It was the custom in the past for the guard to salute the commander of the British Air Force in Mosul when he visited the Mutasarrifate during official celebrations. On His Majesty the King's birthday, when the guard was sent to the Government House to salute the consuls as stated in the Iraqi Army orders, the guard commander asked the Area Commander whether he should salute the Air Force commander when he comes to visit the Mutasarrifate, and the Area Commander replied that there was no need for that because army orders do not authorize it. Yes, army orders do not allow the guard to salute except for those whose positions are mentioned in those orders, and they do not include the British commanders employed in the British forces stationed in Iraq. It is unfortunate that the failure to salute took place at a time when nerves were frayed and suspicion was widespread. 10 D 28 / 5 / 933
Page 9
Copy of the secret report numbered 11208 and dated May 24, 1933, submitted by the Chief of Staff of the Army to His Excellency the Minister of Defense. According to your verbal order, I went yesterday to Mosul by plane and returned from there. I left Al-Hunaidi airport at five-thirty and arrived in Mosul at seven-thirty. I left Mosul at sixteen-thirty and arrived at Al-Hunaidi airport at nineteen-thirty. 1 - I first met with the commander of the northern region, General Bakr Sidqi, and clarified from him the incidents that occurred in Mosul. He stated that the throwing of stones at the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib began on the night of 11/12 May and continued for six days without interruption, despite the fact that the police set up observers in his house and the adjacent houses, placed secret police, and sent the commissioner and the assistant for investigation. The stone-throwing led to the wounding and bruising of some women and the destruction of the house of the director of the Education School, which is adjacent to the house of Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib. The aforementioned Lieutenant Colonel identified one of the throwers on the first night, who is Shleimon, and filed a lawsuit with the police. The discipline soldiers accompanying the police and the homeowners confirm that the stones were being thrown from the house of Mar Shimun and the house of Shleimon. Some of the police witnessed this and mentioned it verbally in the presence of several officers. The school director first left his house, followed by Lieutenant Colonel Kamil Shabib leaving his house along with other officers in the same neighborhood. When the regional commander saw that the Assyrian boys had begun opening the door of his house during the day at various times and inciting, he was forced to leave his house as well, which is in the same neighborhood. 2 - The regional commander believes that the throwing was organized by the Assyrians living in that neighborhood at the instigation of Mar Shimun, and that the police did not use their influence to arrest the violators and prevent the throwing due to their weakness and failure to appreciate the situation. He supports his conviction with the following points: First - Despite the presence of the police and their observation of the houses at night, the throwing was continuous and sometimes hit the houses from which the assistant police and the commissioner were observing. It is certain that the stones were being thrown from a nearby house not exceeding the courtyard of the adjacent houses in which each of the Lieutenant Colonel, the school director, Captain Abdul Qadir Al-Azzawi, Mar Shimun, Shleimon, and Sadiq Shimun live.